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DOMESTIC RELATIONS
BY STEVEN S. CRONE*
In recent years Domestic Relations has been a heavily lit-
igated and rapidly changing1 area of the law. This survey year
has been no exception as the Kentucky appellate courts ren-
dered significant decisions regarding marital property divi-
sions, maintenance and support, and termination of parental
rights. This article will consider the recent developments in
each of these areas.
I. DIVISION OF MARITAL PROPERTY
The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, which has been
adopted in Kentucky and four other states,2 reflects a shared
enterprise or partnership theory of marriage. Kentucky's ver-
sion of the Act, which is similar to the law of partnership,3
provides that all property acquired by either spouse during a
marriage is presumed to be marital property regardless of how
title is held,4 and when the marriage "partnership" is dis-
solved, marital assets must be distributed by the court.5 While
* J.D. 1981, University of Kentucky.
The family law practitioner must keep abreast of recent developments to pro-
tect himself from malpractice exposure. In Smith v. Lewis, 530 P.2d 589 (Cal. 1975),
an attorney was held liable to his client for malpractice in the sum of $100,000 for
failing to research and argue the then open question of whether federal military re-
tirement pay was divisible marital property.
2 The other states are Arizona, Colorado, Illinois and Montana. 9A UNIFORM
LAWS ANN., Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, 91 (1979). Kentucky's divorce law
was patterned after the divorce portion of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act
promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
and is contained in Ky. REv. STAT. §§ 403.010 to .350 (Cum. Supp. 1980) [hereinafter
cited as KRS].
3 "All property originally brought into the partnership stock or subsequently ac-
quired by purchase or otherwise, on account of the partnership, is partnership prop-
erty." Section 8(1) Uniform Partnership Act, 6 UNIFORM LAWS ANN., Uniform Part-
nership Act, 115 (1969).
4 KRS § 403.190(3) (Cum. Supp. 1980).
1 Casenote, Domestic Relations Law - Dissolution of Marriage - Property Provi-
sions of New Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act are Constitutional -
The Exact Nature of the Interest of the Nontitle Holding Spouse During the Mar-
riage Still Needs Clarification, 1978 S. ILL. U.L.J. 598, 601. In many jurisdictions the
trial judge, after hearing testimony from appraisers and accountants follows a three
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the distribution must be an equitable one, it will not necessa-
rily be in equal shares. The court may consider, for example,
the contribution each spouse made to the marital estate6 and
the amount of pre-marital or otherwise exempt property
owned by each.7 Property division under the Act replaces ali-
mony8 as the primary means of support for divorced persons.9
Recognizing that support payments often serve only to con-
tinue unwanted relationships, the Act strictly limits their use.
Several statutory exceptions to marital property, such as gifts
and certain types of pensions, may significantly thwart this
goal, however, by requiring the court to provide for mainte-
nance payments.
A. The Gift Exception to Marital Property
Since gifts are not considered marital property under the
Kentucky version of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act,10
they are not generally divisible upon dissolution of a marriage.
A gift from a third party to one spouse during the marriage,
for instance, is treated on divorce simply as nonmarital prop-
erty.11 A possible exception to this rule may arise when Ken-
tucky courts consider the situation where such a gift was
made to both spouses. 12 In that case, it may be much more
reasonable to divide the gift than to determine whom the do-
nor intended to benefit.
Intraspousal gifts also create a problem under the statute.
The Kentucky Court of Appeals addressed this issue in
step approach in making an equitable distribution of marital property:
(1) decide specific property of each spouse subject to equitable distribution;
(2) determine its value for purpose of equitable distribution; and
(3) decide on most equitable allocation of the property.
Grosman, Identification and Valuation of Assets Subject to Equitable Distribution,
56 N.D. L. REV. 201, 204 (1980).
6 KRS § 403.190(1) (Cum. Supp. 1980).
7 KRS § 403.190(2) (Cum. Supp. 1980).
8 See KRS § 403.190(1) (Cum. Supp. 1980).
9 "Maintenance" is substituted in the new act for the old term "alimony." See
text accompanying notes 71 to 90 infra for a discussion of maintenance.
10 9A UNIFORM LAWS ANN., Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, 93 (1979) (Com-
missioners' Prefatory Note).
11 See KRS § 403.190(2)(a) (Cum. Supp. 1980).
2 See, e.g., Brunson v. Brunson, 569 S.W.2d 173 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
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O'Neill v. O'Neill,1" in which jewelry worth $50,900 was pur-
chased by a husband with his salary and given on various oc-
casions to his wife. Mrs. O'Neill argued successfully before the
circuit court that the jewelry came within the gift exemption
of Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) section 403.190(2)(a)
and thus was nonmarital property that she was entitled to
keep without credit being given to her husband upon division
of the marital property. 14 The Kentucky Court of Appeals re-
versed, however, holding that the "transfers were not a gift
within the meaning of the statute and... [t]o hold otherwise
would completely ignore the contribution of Dr. O'Neill in the
acquisition of the property, a factor that must be considered
under KRS Chapter 403.' ' 15
Although the O'Neill court stated that the classification
of property as gift or non-gift should be based on the perti-
nent facts in each case,1" it identified several factors that
might suggest a finding of marital property. First, the money
used to purchase the gift was a marital asset such as a
spouse's salary; second, the gift was motivated by things other
than donative intent,1 7 such as expected appreciation in value;
third, the marital relationship was strong at the time of the
gift; and fourth, the spouses had not agreed that the gift
would be excluded from marital property. 8 The O'Neill court
placed heavy emphasis on Dr. O'Neill's testimony that the
jewelry was purchased as an investment and was also im-
pressed with the value of the jewelry as compared with the
rest of the marital estate. The decision underscores the impor-
tance of viewing gifts in the context of the marriage and indi-
cates that neither spouse can lay claim to significant assets as
nonmarital property merely because that spouse personally
uses the property.
13 600 S.W.2d 493 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).
14 Id. at 495.
15 Id. at 496.
16 Id. at 495.
7 See Leatherman v. Leatherman, 256 S.E.2d 793, 797 (N.C. 1979).
Is Id. See Ghali v. Ghali, 596 S.W.2d 31 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980). In Ghali, the fac-
tors considered in O'Neill were not present, and the Ghali court held two rings to be
gifts and thus not part of the marital property.
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B. Pensions as Marital Property
Pensions are considered in most jurisdictions today as
part of the marital property.19 Kentucky courts have followed
this trend in their treatment of noncontributory private pen-
sion plans that have accrued totally during the marriage20 but
have not adopted this position in two other pension areas:
nonvested pension plans21 and vested, noncontributory gov-
ernment-funded pension plans.22
1. Nonvested Pension Plans
Amounts contained in nonvested pension plans were
found not to be marital property in Ratcliff v. Ratcliff.23 The
Kentucky Court of Appeals, while recognizing that courts are
authorized under KRS section 403.190(1) to consider all rele-
vant factors, including economic circumstances,24 found the
interest too speculative to be divided.25 The court in reaching
this decision, however, failed to adequately consider the spe-
cial significance of pensions to a marriage. As one commenta-
tor has stated:
[P]ension" rights are for many families the most substantial
single asset acquired by the parties. The important expecta-
tions attached to this asset by both husband and wife can-
19 Common law property states, such as Kentucky, have been faced increasingly
with the issue of considering a pension as part of the marital estate. Common law
jurisdictions must look to the community property states of Arizona, California,
Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas and Washington for guidance in this
area. In community property states "each party to the marriage has a legal claim to
half of all property acquired during marriage." Note, Pensions as Property Subject to
Equitable Division Upon Divorce in Oklahoma, 14 TuLSA L. J. 168 n.6 (1978).
20 See Frost v. Frost, 581 S.W.2d 582, 583 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
21 A number of jurisdictions recognize spousal claims to even nonvested benefits.
See In re Marriage of Brown, 544 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1976); Stern v. Stern, 331 A.2d 257
(N.J. 1975); Clearly v. Clearly, 544 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. 1976).
22 A pension plan is vested, and thus considered a property right, when the em-
ployee has rights to the funds in the plan which cannot be forfeited by the happening
of an event such as discharge or resignation of the employee prior to retirement.
Note, supra note 19, at 174-75; Casenote, Domestic Relations - Husband's "Vested"
Interest in Retirement Plan is Divisible as Marital Property, 42 Mo. L. REV. 143,
145 (1977).
22 586 S.W.2d 292 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
24 Id.
25 Id. at 293.
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not be overstated. They involve, after all, the fundamental
belief by both spouses that their mutual security in later
years will be protected by pension benefits. They also in-
volve an assumption of interdependence and wealth sharing
that has almost certainly been held jointly by both husband
and wife during their years of marriage. As between the two
spouses, it would seem unfair to deny to one of them the
security and the sharing that both assumed would occur, at
least where there are available adequate and fair judicial
tools for measuring, valuing and allocating the interests
involved.
26
By simply exercising its authority under KRS section
403.190(1) and by retaining supervisory powers over the case
as divorce courts frequently do,27 the problem of speculative
value could have been easily avoided.28
2. Vested, Noncontributory Government-Funded Pension
Plans
Kentucky treats vested, noncontributory private pension
plans as marital property subject to division upon dissolution
of marriage. 29 However, in Russell v. Russell,30 the Kentucky
Court of Appeals held a similar military pension that had ac-
crued totally during the marriages' to be nonmarital property
not subject to division between the spouses. Only the fact that
the plan was government financed kept the statutory pension
in Russell from being deemed marital property.
3 2
The Russell court examined the congressional intent un-
derlying the federal military pension statutes, finding that
Congress viewed military retirement pay as personal in na-
26 Bonavich, Allocation of Private Pension Benefits as Property in Illinois Di-
vorce Proceedings, 29 DEPAuL L. REv. 1, 16 (1979).
27 In Graham v. Graham, 595 S.W.2d 720 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980), the court permit-
ted the wife to live at the marital home until the youngest child reached the age of
18, or until the wife remarried or died. On the occurrence of one of those events, the
property was to be sold and the proceeds divided between husband and wife. See
Bonavich, supra note 26, at 15.
25 Bonavich, supra note 26, at 15.
29 See 581 S.W.2d at 583.
20 605 S.W.2d 33 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).
31 Id. at 35.
a2 Id. at 36.
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ture. Amendments to the military retirement statute permit-
ted a serviceman to voluntarily participate in an annuity pro-
gram to benefit his surviving spouse, but her interest in the
annuity ended upon death or subsequent remarriage. The
Russell court thus determined that the federal interest of in-
suring a serviceman's spouse does not include supporting a
serviceman's ex-spouses' and then concluded that "the pur-
pose of the plan was 'to safeguard the participant's future re-
tired pay when ... a divorce occurs.' ",34
In formulating its decision, the Russell court relied upon
Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo,3 5 in which the United States Su-
preme Court held that benefits under the Railroad Retire-
ment Act could not be considered community property be-
cause the benefits were governed by federal statute. Thus the
Russell court found that the conflict between the federal in-
terest of providing income to a serviceman and Kentucky's in-
terest in providing an equitable distribution of marital prop-
erty must be resolved in favor of the federal interest under
the Supremacy Clause.3 6 The court, in acknowledging that
several jurisdictions 37 have held military retirement pay to be
community or marital property and that Hisquierdo could be
distinguished as involving the Railroad Retirement Act rather
than military pay,38 stated: "These cases are persuasive, but
they are not binding in [Kentucky]." 39
By defining military pensions as nonmarital property, the
Russell decision conflicts with the Uniform Marriage and Di-
vorce Act policy of favoring property division over mainte-
3 Id.
34 Id.
35 439 U.S. 572 (1979).
605 S.W.2d at 36.
In re Marriage of Fithian, 517 P.2d 449 (Cal.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 825
(1974); Ramsey v. Ramsey, 535 P.2d 53 (Idaho 1975); Kruger v. Kruger, 375 A.2d 659
(N.J. 1977); Dominey v. Dominey, 481 S.W.2d 473 (Tex. Civ. App.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1028 (1972). The Russell court also cited jurisdictions holding military pensions
not to be marital property. Cose v. Cose, 592 P.2d 1230 (Alaska 1979), appeal pend-
ing, 446 U.S. 933 (1980); Fenney v. Fenney, 537 S.W.2d 367 (Ark. 1976); Ellis v. Ellis,
552 P.2d 506 (Colo. 1976).
u 605 S.W.2d at 35.
39 Id.
[Vol. 69
1980-81] SURVEY-DoMESTIC RELATIONS
nance payments. 40 While this has the positive effect of al-
lowing division of future as well as accumulated pension
earnings, 1 the negative consequences are far greater. For ex-
ample, it can be argued that "a pension is deferred compensa-
tion which is earned during each day or month of military ser-
vice or other work."42 This compensation "would have been
available to the parties during their marriage to be invested in
stocks, bonds, savings account, annuity and/or other invest-
ments.' 43 This deferred compensation could have been used
during the marriage, not only to augment the marital estate
but also to raise the standard of living.44 Furthermore, in
Kentucky a maintenance award is discretionary, 5 and, unlike
a property division, it may even be based partially on the mis-
conduct of one spouse.4" Thus, if a pension is to be considered
only in determining the maintenance award and if the court in
its discretion makes no award for maintenance, the spouse
with the pension may end up with a secure future while the
other spouse receives nothing.47 The Russell court did recog-
40 See the text accompanying note 9 supra for the Uniform Marriage and Di-
vorce Act's view of maintenance awards and property division. See the text accompa-
nying notes 71 to 90 infra for a discussion of maintenance and support generally.
41 If the pension is considered income, the entire pension account is available for
maintenance purposes since a court can award maintenance in the amount it deems
just; KRS § 403.200(2) (Cum. Supp. 1980); but if the pension is considered marital
property, only the amount accumulated during the marriage is subject to division.
KRS § 413.190(3) (Cum. Supp. 1980).
42 Light v. Light, 599 S.W.2d 476, 478 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980). The Light court held,
however, that even though a military pension may be considered deferred compensa-
tion Russell precludes finding a military pension to be marital property.
43 Hutchins v. Hutchins, 248 N.W.2d 272, 277 (Mich. Ct. App. 1976).
4 See Scherzer v. Scherzer, 346 A.2d 434 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975), cert.
denied, 354 A.2d 319 (N.J. 1976).
45 Browning v. Browning, 551 S.W.2d 823 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).
46 Chapman v. Chapman, 498 S.W.2d 134, 138 (Ky. 1973). KRS § 403.200(2)
omits the language "without regard to marital misconduct" which is present in §
308(b) of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act. 9A UNIFORM LAWS ANN., Uniform
Marriage and Divorce Act, 160 (1979). Marital property is divided in Kentucky with-
out regard to marital misconduct. KRS § 403.190(1) (Cur. Supp. 1980).
4 See In re Marriage of Brown, 544 P.2d 561, 567 (Cal. 1976). The Brown court
answered the husband who insisted that an award of alimony would compensate his
wife for not receiving a share of his pension benefits. "Alimony, however, lies within
the discretion of the trial court; the spouse should not be dependent upon the discre-
tion of the court... to provide her with the equivalent of what should be hers as a
matter of absolute right." But see Baker v. Baker, 546 P.2d 1325 (Okla. 1976). The
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nize this inequity, stating that a military pension may often
be the only significant asset in a family, and "a spouse must
not be left destitute and without some support, simply be-
cause the pension is not divisible property." 48
C. Valuation of Marital Property
A trial court faces a valuation problem when property is
purchased with both marital and nonmarital funds. This
problem is compounded when the property appreciates in
value during the marriage. The Kentucky Supreme Court
faced this problem in Newman v. Newman,49 in which a home
and lot had been purchased for $68,000. Of this amount,
$55,000 in nonmarital assets had been supplied by the hus-
band,50 and $13,000 in marital assets had been borrowed to
finance construction of the house. The trial court noted that
19.12% of the original price was paid with marital assets and
determined that of the $125,000 appreciated value, the same
percentage, or $23,900, should be considered marital property
on divorce. The trial court then awarded 60% of the marital
property to the husband because the accumulation of the es-
tate was primarily and indisputedly the result of his efforts.,1
Mrs. Newman's interest in the home and lot was therefore
40% of $23,900, or $9,560.2
Mrs. Newman argued on appeal that her share of the
marital interest should have been determined by subtracting
her husband's original contribution of $55,000 from the appre-
ciated value of $125,000 and multiplying the difference by her
40% interest. According to this formula, her share would
amount to $28,000. 1 The formula used by the trial judge and
Oklahoma view is that it is not fair to divide the retirement fund and then to make
the husband pay alimony for support out of his portion.
41 605 S.W.2d at 36.
49 597 S.W.2d 137 (Ky. 1980).
50 This calculation was based on the premise that inherited property is
nonmarital. KRS § 403.190(2)(a) (Cum. Supp. 1980).
"I See text accompanying notes 6-7 supra for a discussion of the principle that
equitable distribution does not necessarily mean an even distribution.
92 597 S.W.2d at 138-39.
13 Id. at 139.
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affirmed by the Kentucky Supreme Court54 is clearly the bet-
ter formula because it treats property acquired with combined
marital and nonmarital assets in the same way as distinct
marital and nonmarital properties: any appreciation attrib-
uted to an original asset remains a part of that asset. Just as
personal, nonmarital property is awarded to the owner spouse
on divorce regardless of any appreciation, the nonmarital por-
tion of any property should not be limited to its original,
unappreciated value.
It should be noted that KRS section 403.190(2)(e) pro-
vides a remedy for a spouse who contributes little to the ac-
quisition of property, but who contributes greatly to improve-
ments. If the increase in value of nonmarital property is
attributable to the joint efforts of the spouses, such increases
are considered marital property subject to division.55
D. Marital Property After Separation
Property or property interests acquired after a separation
but before a divorce may not be subject to division. The Su-
preme Court of Kentucky confronted this issue in Stallings v.
Stallings.5 After being married for over thirteen years, Gay
and Bob Stallings separated on January 1, 1976. Neither party
obtained a decree of legal separation under KRS section
403.140(2), however, and the marriage was not officially dis-
solved until June 16, 1978.17
Three items of property had increased in value during the
two and one-half year separation: the undistributed profits of
a law partnership, an individual retirement account, and a
54 Id.
Il See Angel v. Angel, 562 S.W.2d 663 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978). The court in Angel
held that the portion of the proceeds from the sale of a farm attributable to the
investment of the husband's $1400 inheritance constituted nonmarital property while
that portion of the proceeds from the sale attributable to the improvements and the
payment of the balance of the purchase price for the land which was made as a "team
effort" constituted marital property. But see Brunson v. Brunson, 569 S.W.2d 173,
178 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978). The Brunson court held that any accumulation of income
from a husband's nonmarital property constituted marital property to be divided by
the court.
606 S.W.2d 163 (Ky. 1980).
Id. at 163-64.
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one-half interest in a Florida condominium .5  The court of
apppeals held that "only the values at separation were includ-
able in the marital estate because the later increments in
value were the product of [the husband's] individual earning
capacity rather than the 'team or joint efforts' of the par-
ties."59 The Kentucky Supreme Court, however, reversed,
stating that KRS section 403.190(2)60 clearly requires that in
order to be excluded from a marital estate property must be
acquired after a legal separation decree under KRS section
403.190(2). The mere actual or physical separation in Stall-
ings, therefore, would not fulfill the statutory requirement.61
While both the explicit language in KRS section
403.190(2)(c) 62 and the Stallings interpretation provide cer-
tainty, the result may prove unfair in some situations. For ex-
ample, when it is obvious that a marriage is no longer viable
and property is acquired during a lengthy separation, it would
appear that the property should be considered marital prop-
erty subject to division.63 Nevertheless, it is clear that lawyers
66 The values of the assets at the applicable times are as follows:
Value at Value at
Property Separation Dissolution
Undistributed profits of
law partnership $61,046.51 $100,161.00
Individual Retirement
Account $ 1,500.00 $ 5,025.76
One-half equity in Florida
condominium $ -0- $ 4,750.00
Id. at 164.
59 Id.
60 KRS § 403.190(2) (Cum. Supp. 1980) provides in relevant part:
For the purpose of this chapter, 'marital property' means all property ac-
quired by either spouse subsequent to the marriage except:
(c) Property acquired by a spouse after a decree of legal separation.
Id. (emphasis added).
1 606 S.W.2d at 164.
62 It can certainly be argued that the statute is forewarning.
63 Brandenburg v. Brandenburg, 400 A.2d 823, 826 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1979). See also In re Marriage of Smith, 128 Cal. Rptr. 410, 412 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976).
The Smith court held that by statute the date of separation determines the extent of
the community interest in property and property acquired subsequent to a separation
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must advise their clients in accordance with the Stallings de-
cision. Without a KRS section 403.140(2) decree of legal sepa-
ration, property acquired by a spouse during actual separation
will be considered marital property subject to division be-
tween the spouses upon divorce.
E. Marital Debts
Under KRS section 403.190(3) all property acquired after
a marriage by either spouse is presumed to be marital prop-
erty. In Bodie v. Bodie,e4 however, the Kentucky Court of Ap-
peals held that KRS section 403.190(3) did not create a pre-
sumption that all debts acquired during marriage are marital
debts. The court further refused to judicially imply such a
presumption in the statute. 5 In Bodie, the spouse who
claimed that the debts were marital failed to produce any evi-
dence as to their marital nature and also refused to answer
questions concerning the debts. The Bodie court held that the
spouse had thus failed to meet his burden of proof that the
debts were marital, and he was therefore individually liable
for the debts.6
Although Bodie may be justifiable on its facts, it is argua-
ble that under a "partnership" theory of marriage, assets and
liabilities should be treated the same.67 Additionally, the
Bodie court may have incorrectly distinguished Bruton v.
of any kind is the separate property of the individual spouse. This is interesting be-
cause common law equitable distribution jurisdictions, such as Kentucky, usually
turn to community property jurisdictions, such as California, for guidance in dividing
marital property.
61 590 S.W.2d 895 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
65 Id. at 896.
66 Id.
'7 See note 3 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the partnership
theory of marriage under the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act. Under section 15(b)
of the Uniform Partnership Act all partners are jointly liable for all debts and obliga-
tions of the partnership. 6 UNIFORM LAWS ANN., Uniform Partnership Act, 174 (1976).
Under the partnership theory, if property acquired after marriage is presumed to be
marital, then debts acquired after marriage should also be presumed marital. But see
Note, Ddtermining the Liability of Community Property - Cockerham v. Cockerham,
29 BAYLOR L. REv. 608, 611 (1977). "[T]he owing of a debt is a liability.incurred and
is not a property interest acquired by the debtor." Id.
1980-81]
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Bruton,6 8 in which the court refused to allow a spouse to dis-
claim liability for debts known to the spouse which were in-
curred during the marriage. In Bodie, while the spouse seek-
ing to have the debts declared nonmarital had no knowledge
of the debts,69 a crucial factor, as in Bruton, was that the
spouse did enjoy the benefits of the indebtedness. In such a
case, lack of knowledge should not be sufficient to prevent lia-
bility on a debt.
7 0
II. MAINTENANCE AND SUPPORT
A. Statutory Requirements of Maintenance
Awarding of maintenance is a matter within the discre-
tion of the trial court. 1 Maintenance may be granted to a
spouse under KRS section 403.200(1)(a) and (b) only if that
spouse has insufficient property to provide for his or her rea-
sonable needs7 2 and has insufficient employment as a result of
rearing a child.73
The Kentucky Court of Appeals took a strict position on
the question of maintenance in Richie v. Richie 4 In that
case, no significant property rights were involved, and one
trial court assigned the wife an open-ended $20.00 per week
maintenance award .7 Although Mrs. Richie had not worked
outside her home since the birth of her infant daughter be-
cause she had felt the need to be at home to care for her child,
the court applied the statute 6 strictly and reversed the
award.77 The court reasoned that Mrs. Richie had a compara-
ble education to that of her husband and that with necessary
training she could work outside her home and still care for her
68 569 S.W.2d 182 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
69 590 S.W.2d at 896.
70 See 569 S.W.2d at 182.
71 551 S.W.2d at 825.
72 Since the word "and" instead of "or" is used between subparts (a) and (b), it
is clear that both parts of the test are to be met in order for a court to award
maintenance.
73 KRS § 403.200(1)(a) and (b) (Cum. Supp. 1980).
74 596 S.W.2d 32 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).
78 Id. at 33.
78 KRS § 403.200(1)(a) and (b) (Cum. Supp. 1980).
77 596 S.W.2d at 33-34.
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daughter who was ready to enter school.78 The court did not
indicate whether its decision would have been different if the
infant daughter had been of pre-school age.
The Kentucky Court of Appeals continued this strict view
of maintenance in Graham v. Graham.7 ' At the time of disso-
lution, the parties had been married for twelve years and had
two infant children. Mrs. Graham had been a housewife for
most of the marriage, employed only briefly in a series of jobs.
At the time of dissolution, she had a job earning $112.00 per
week and she was attending college; Mr. Graham was earning
$200.68 per week. After separating nonmarital property, the
trial court divided marital property and awarded custody of
the children and $300.00 per month child support to Mrs.
Graham. She was also allowed to live in the marital home dur-
ing the children's minority or until she remarried or died.
On appeal, Mrs. Graham claimed the circuit court erred
by not awarding her maintenance for four years while she
finished college. 0 The Kentucky Court of Appeals held that
maintenance can be awarded only if both the lack of property
and employment requirements in KRS section 403.200(1)(a)
and (b) are met.s' The court stated that "[t]here appears to
be no requirement under the statute for the trial court to
make a finding as to the wife's reasonable needs if it finds that
she is able to support herself through appropriate employ-
ment. '8 2 Thus if a spouse is able to support herself, the court
will not look further to see whether she lacks sufficient prop-
erty to provide for her reasonable needs. This is a strict appli-
78 Id. at 34.
79 595 S.W.2d 720 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).
" Id. at 721.
81 KRS § 403.200 is identical to Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act § 308. See
text accompanying notes 72 and 73 supra for the two part test for maintenance
awards. The Commissioners' Comment to § 308 implies that the reason for the strict
two part test for an award of maintenance is to encourage courts to provide for the
financial needs of the spouses by property disposition rather than by an award of
maintenance. 9A UNIFORM LAWS ANN., Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, 161
(1979). This is in line with the Act's policy which favors ending unwanted relation-
ships by providing financial independence through property division rather than pre-
serving them by making one spouse dependent on another for support through a
maintenance award.
2 595 S.W.2d at 722.
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cation of the statute and could lead to inequitable results
where, for example, a wife postpones her own college educa-
tion to support her college-attending spouse. Upon divorce, if
this wife is able to work, she may miss the opportunity for a
college education since the court will be reluctant to award
her maintenance under the statute.
B. Nonvested Pensions as a Basis for Maintenance
Notwithstanding its holding in Ratcliff that nonvested
pensions are too speculative to be divided as marital prop-
erty, 3 the Kentucky Court of Appeals nevertheless held in
Light v. Light84 that a nonvested, and therefore contingent,
military pension may form the basis for a maintenance
award. 5 The court found that the total economic circum-
stances of the parties in Light demanded some amount of
maintenance. In that case, there was little marital property6
and the wife would have been left with little to show for her
twenty-two and one-half years of marriage, while the husband
would have had his military pension and the ability to earn
money in civilian employment as the result of his army train-
ing.8 1 Thus the court declared that maintenance based on the
current monthly benefit amount of a pension could be
awarded for as long as the husband was eligible to receive the
benefits. The wife was not entitled to a lump sum disposi-
tion,8 8 since the husband's rights and benefits in the pension
were prospective only. This avoids the problem of determining
a present cash value for the entire pension and also avoids the
need for application of property principles to an indefinite
and contingent asset.
While admitting that rigid formulas for pension benefit
division are untenable since circumstances vary among mar-
riages, the Light court offered the following guidelines to gov-
83 See text accompanying notes 8-48 supra for a discussion of pensions as marital
property.
84 599 S.W.2d 476 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).
85 Id. at 478.
88 Id. at 477.
87 Id. at 478.
88 Id. at 478-79.
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ern maintenance awards based on prospective pension bene-
fits: (1) the settlement should be as final as possible at the
time of the divorce; (2) the amount and starting point for the
pension must be determined since dissolution may occur long
before payment eligibility and immediate maintenance might
be required; (3) the value of the pension and the amount to be
paid as maintenance must be determined as of the time of the
dissolution since the primary purpose is to share an asset; and
(4) any maintenance based on the husband's pension should
be limited if the wife is accruing pension and social security
benefits through a job of her own. 9 Acknowledging that ongo-
ing maintenance should be avoided since it ties the divorcing
parties together, the court stated that equity may require
speculative divisions of contingent pensions as a last resort.90
IMl. TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
A. Neglected and Abandoned Children
By statute, parental rights of the parents of dependent,91
neglected, or abused9 2 children may be involuntarily termi-
89 Id. at 479.
90 Id. at 480.
91 KRS § 199.011(5) (Cum. Supp. 1980) defines a dependent child as "any child
who is under improper care, control or guardianship that is not due to the negligence
of the parent or guardian, provided that the child is not an abused or neglected
child."
92 KRS § 199.011(6) (Cum. Supp. 1980) defines an abused or neglected child as
follows:
a child whose health or welfare is harmed or threatened with harm when
his parent, guardian or other person who has the permanent or temporary
care, custody or responsibility for the supervision of the child: inflicts or
allows to be inflicted upon the child, physical or mental injury to the child
by other than accidental means; creates or allows to be created a risk of
physical or mental injury to the child by other than accidental means; com-
mits or allows to be committed an act of sexual abuse upon the child; will-
fully abandons or exploits such child; does not provide the child with ade-
quate care and supervision; food, clothing and shelter; education; or
medical care necessary for the child's well-being; provided, however, that a
parent or guardian legitimately practicing his religious beliefs who thereby
does not provide specified medical treatment for a child, for that reason
alone shall not be considered a negligent parent or guardian. This excep-
tion, however, shall not preclude a court from ordering that medical ser-
vices be provided to the child, where his health requires it.
1980-81]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
nated. KRS section 199.603(1) provides:
In a proceeding involving a dependent, neglected or abused
child. . the circuit court may terminate all parental rights
of the parent of such child, and declare the child to be a
ward of the state and vest the care, custody and control of
the child in the department [for human resources], or in any
licensed child-caring or child placing agency or institution, if
facilities are available to receive the child, and if it is
pleaded and proved by preponderance of the evidence in a
private hearing that the termination is in the best interest of
the child based on the existence of one (1) or both of the
following conditions: (a) The child has been abandoned; or
(b) The child has been substantially or continuously or re-
peatedly neglected or abused.
Part (b) of this statute, clearly the more difficult part to
prove, was considered by the Kentucky Supreme Court in De-
partment for Human Resources v. Pinkleton9 3 In that case,
the Department for Human Resources brought an action to
terminate parental rights of Sam Chapman and Vivian Pin-
kleton as to their illegitimate son Andre. The Department was
successful in terminating Sam's rights but was unsuccessful in
ending Vivian's and thus appealed the trial court decision. 4
Evidence was presented by the Department that the infant
had various physical and emotional defects; his IQ was de-
scribed as educable mentally handicapped, and he had ar-
rested encephelitis. The record indicated that the roach and
mouse infested apartment where Vivian and Andre lived was
dirty and cluttered, and food was left lying about. Further-
more, it was shown that Andre was kept in a high chair too
much, which deprived him of the opportunity to improve his
motor skills. The child was temporarily placed with his aunt
and was later committed to the Department. The Department
decided to terminate the mother's parental rights because of
the substandard home conditions, the child's emotional and
medical needs, the mother's lack of visitation, and the absence
of a relative's home for placement.
9 5
'3 No. 79-SC-465-DG (Ky. June 24, 1980).
11 Id., slip op. at 1.
95 Id., slip op. at 3-4.
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The trial court held that these conditions did not consti-
tute such improper parental care or neglect as to establish
grounds for terminating the mother's parental rights. The
court of appeals affirmed the decision, but the Supreme Court
reversed, stating that additional facts should have been con-
sidered by the trial court. The Supreme Court perceived as an
important factor that the juvenile court had provided tempo-
rary foster care. 96 The Court also considered the mother's in-
difference and lack of affection for Andre and stated: "The
plight of Vivian is not the result of poverty; on the other hand
her condition is the result of her placing little value or impor-
tance on the proper care of Andre.
'97
The test the Court developed in Pinkleton for involunta-
rily terminating parental rights is not that "the proof be con-
clusive to justify the termination; but rather [that] it is only
necessary that the evidence show that the termination would
be for the child's welfare."98
While the facts in Pinkleton strongly support the Court's
holding, a further exploration of alternatives to removal of the
child from his home was warranted. Serious psychological in-
jury may result from placing a child in a state institution or
foster home99 that may be no better than the home from
which he was removed, and the frequent relocation of the
child may cause additional psychological harm.100 Existing so-
cial services such as parental training or counseling, home-
making services, and home supervision 0 may provide a less
91 Id., slip op. at 5.
97 Id.
11 Id. The Court applied a "best interest of the child" analysis, although it did
not use the phrase. The term "best interest of the child" persists despite the work of
J. GOLDSTEIN, A FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
(1973), in which it is urged that courts adopt the "least detrimental alternatives"
formula. Under such a formula all the applicable alternatives would be viewed by the
court and the one that would have the least detrimental effects on the child would be
chosen. Id. at 53.
9" Developments in the Law - The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARV. L.
REV. 1156, 1320 (1980).
100 Id.
10! Id. at 1321. But see Spaeth, The Limits of Family Law, 51 PENN. BAR ASS'N
Q. 125, 129-31 (1980). Judge Spaeth discusses the problems of state supervision in
this area, such as understaffed social services agencies and the continued effectiveness
of a judge's order.
1980-81]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
traumatic solution to the problem of abusive or neglectful
parents. These alternatives should be explicitly considered by
courts in applying KRS section 199.603(1).
In Hafley v. McCubbins,10 2 the court of appeals was faced
with an abandonment question of first impression in Ken-
tucky. The court stated: "What we seek is an acceptable crite-
ria [sic] for civil matters involving recovery of damages or
benefits by a parent as opposed to a custodial nonparent
where it is alleged that the natural parent has 'abandoned' the
offspring.' 0 3 In Hafley, the new mother of twin boys moved
in with the McCubbins and after six weeks moved away, leav-
ing the twins to be raised by the couple as their own. Al-
though there was some evidence that the mother had orally
agreed to an adoption by the McCubbins, formal adoption was
never accomplished. Upon reaching the age of sixteen, one
twin was told of his true parentage, and he visited with his
mother, even residing with her for short periods of time. After
serving in the army, returning home, and then reenlisting, he
was killed in a nonmilitary incident. Both the mother and the
McCubbins claimed the right to a $20,000 life insurance
policy.
104
Upon examining the Serviceman's Group Life Insurance
statute, the Hafley court concluded that a mother who aban-
doned her child is not entitled to any recovery from the insur-
ance proceeds.10 5 Thus the primary issue became what consti-
tutes abandonment of a child. Abandonment had been
previously considered in Kentucky in the criminal law area
but had never been examined in the context of a civil case. 10
The Hafley court adopted the New York definition of aban-
donment as used in wrongful death cases: neglect and refusal
to perform natural and legal obligations to care and sup-
port.107 The court stated: "From the standpoint of her intent
to abandon her child, we need look no further than her oral
102 590 S.W.2d 892 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
103 Id. at 894.
104 Id. at 893.
100 Id. at 895.
106 Id. at 894.
107 Id.
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agreement to permit adoption by the McCubbins."108
The Hafley definition of abandonment leaves much dis-
cretion to the trial court and may be overly broad. Entrusting
the care and custody of a child to a third party does not nec-
essarily imply desertion, nor does it constitute a waiver of any
expectancy by the parent of future assistance from the child.
It might be better to define abandonment as a failure to sup-
port at the time of the minor's death, whether or not this fail-
ure existed at some previous time.
B. Third Party Termination of Natural Parents' Rights
In Lapinsky v. Shant, °09 a child's stepfather filed a peti-
tion to adopt the child and to terminate the parental rights of
the child's natural father who was in prison at the time. Over
the natural father's objections, the trial court permitted both
the adoption and the termination, and the court of appeals
affirmed. The Kentucky Supreme Court, applying the "best
interest of the child" test,110 affirmed the decision on adop-
tion. It reversed the decision on the termination of parental
rights, however, holding that under KRS section 199.600(b),
only parents and certain specified public concerns could invol-
untarily terminate parental rights.11
KRS section 199.600(b) has now been repealed 11 2 and the
above limitation is no longer applicable. The question of ter-
minating parental rights is now resolved as the adoption ques-
tion is resolved, through the application of the "best interest
of the child" test. That test would require an evaluation of
whether the exercise of parental rights would be damaging to
the child. In Lapinsky, as in other situations, this will depend
on the scope of parental rights. One author has enumerated
these rights as:
the right to physical possession of the child, the right to visit
the child, the right to determine education and religious up-
108 Id. at 895.
109 No. 79-SC-228-DG (Ky. June 3, 1980).
110 Id., slip op. at 5.
Id., slip op. at 2.
112 The repeal was effective June 17, 1978. Involuntary termination of parental
rights is now governed solely by KRS § 199.603 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
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bringing, the right to discipline the child, the right to choose
medical treatment, the right to the child's services, the right
to determine domicile, and the right to appoint guardians
and consent to adoption.""
Arguably, in Lapinsky, the retention of these parental rights
by the natural father would be detrimental to the child. Thus
the outcome in Lapinsky might have been different under the
"best interest of the child" test.
A collateral problem in cases such as Lapinsky is that an
incarcerated natural parent may not be able to attend the
adoption proceedings. In such a case, courts must carefully
scrutinize the effectiveness of that parent's attorney. In
Lapinsky, while the natural father did argue ineffective coun-
sel at the adoption hearing, there was no indication of ineffec-
tiveness, and the court found the trial to be a fair one.114
C. Change of Name
Under a 1974 statute115 a mother had a right to petition a
court to change the surnames of her minor children to that of
her new husband. The Kentucky Court of Appeals in Burke v.
Hammonds,1 " however, held that a mother can be perma-
nently enjoined from doing so where, after a full evidentiary
hearing, the proposed change is found to be contrary to the
best interests of the children.
1 17
Rejecting the divorced mother's contention that a trial
court did not have the jurisdiction to enjoin her permanently
from exercising her right under state law to change the sur-
names of her two children, the Burke court stated that a trial
court has continuing jurisdiction over custody-related matters
attendant upon divorce. The court is mandated by state law
to "safeguard family relationships and mitigate potential
harm" to parents and children. 1 8 The court further stated:
1" Note, The Loss of Parental Rights as a Consequence of Conviction and Im-
prisonment: Unintended Punishment, 6 NEw ENG. J. PRISON L. 61, 64 (1979).
Lapinsky v. Shant, No. 79-SC-228-DG, slip op. at 6.
KRS § 401.020 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
, ' 586 S.W.2d 307 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
117 Id. at 309.
118 Id.
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"No one can seriously argue that changing a child's name
from that of his natural father to that of his stepfather could
not be seriously weaken the emotional bond between the child
and his father, or that such a change would necessarily be in
the child's best interests.
11 9
The Burke court stated that "a natural father has a pro-
tectable right to have his child bear his name.., and injunc-
tive relief is the only remedy by which that right can be ade-
quately protected. ' 120 The court held that the mother's
statutory right-to apply for a name change for her children
was insubstantial when compared with the "public policy of
favoring preservation of family relationships.' 1 21 In 1980 the
General Assembly revised this statute, and it now reflects the
opinion of the courts. Under the revised statute if both par-
ents are living, they may petition for the child's name to be
changed, or if one parent is deceased, the other may petition
for the change. This statute, however, does not extend the
right to petition to a divorced parent if the other natural par-
ent is still alive.
119 Id. Even though the parent's emotional well-being is considered, the best in-
terest of the child takes precedence.
120 Id.
121 Id. Cf. 75 Op. Att'y Gen. 94 (1975).
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